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Introduction 
One of the most important and interesting questions that is likely to arise 
when we consider forgiveness in the context of religious belief is what it 
means for God to forgive human beings. Another is the significance of reli-
gious belief for human forgiveness, that is, the possibility of human beings 
granting forgiveness to other human beings. How these two concerns are 
related, strongly or not, are questions that cannot be dealt with without prior 
understanding of divine forgiveness on its own. 
The present chapter focuses on the concept of the forgiving God in Islamic 
religion and theology and claims that Islamic thinking about divine for-
giveness accommodates two different views that emphasize two different 
attributes of God: justice and mercy. 
First, I explore the grounds for the notion of divine forgiveness in Islam. 
Concepts such as being wronged, desert, and forgoing punishment need to be 
brought together, along with the notion of justice, in order to determine how 
the notion of divine forgiveness can be viewed in Islamic terms. Next, I exam-
ine the possibility of divine forgiveness from the standpoint of justice, one of 
the divine attributes that has dominated much thinking about the Islamic 
view of God. This will be accomplished by an examination of Mu'tazilite1 
I Mu'tazilism is a school of theology which flourished between the 8th and !Qth centu-
ries A.D. in what is now Iraq. The Mu'tazilites are known for their rationalism, belief in 
the objectivity of right and wrong, and freedom of the will (this last being a conse-
quence of their belief in the God's justice). No longer a living tradition, Mu'tazilism 
nevertheless continues to inspire many present -day Islamic thinkers. 
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views about desert, divine punishment, and the possibility of extending for-
giveness to grave sinners and unbelievers. Finally, I consider an alternative 
Islamic view of divine forgiveness. This view is to be found in the writings of 
Islamic, mainly Ash'arite2, thinkers who took the idea of divine mercy more 
seriously than the Mu'tazilites seem to have been able to do. I conclude with 
some reflections on the relative merits of these two rival Islamic views. 
Grounds for the Notion of Divine Forgiveness in Islam 
In this secular age of ours, we have become accustomed to thinking of forgiveness 
as a relation that holds between human beings. It is no longer customary to think 
in terms of God granting forgiveness, except in religious contexts, which have be-
come more and more circumscribed. Thus, in order to discuss divine forgiveness 
in Islam, we have to think anew about the logic of a forgiveness relation that can 
hold between God and humans, for the concepts that come into play in present-
day (non-religious) understandings of forgiveness include some which become 
problematic when God is brought into the discussion 
Take the notion of wrong. for example. We typically think that forgiveness 
comes into play only when someone has committed a culpable wrong against 
another. There is always a wronged party who may, or may not, forgive. Thus, 
if God is to forgive humans, a human must be in a position to wrong God. It is 
here that considerations of divine nature impinge on the discussion of for-
giveness. How can God be wronged? Can this be reconciled with His omnipo-
tence and self-sufficiency? 
Then again, take the notion of "retributive emotion." We tend to believe that 
when one is wronged, harmed, or unjustly treated, one resents and acquires 
motivations to exact retribution. Many authors insist that forgiveness entails 
overcoming retributive emotions, as well as forbearance with regard to pun-
ishment (Hieronymi 2001, 529-55; Murphy and Hampton 1988). Here again, 
considerations of divine nature seem to stand in the way of comparing divine 
forgiveness to familiar human forgiveness, for according to a philosophically 
considered view of divine nature, God is not only omnipotent, but He is also 
impassible and unchangeable. How can He overcome retributive emotions or 
change from rejection to acceptance of wrongdoers? 
Ideas of divine omnipotence and impassibility are bound to make the dis-
cussion of forgiveness harder than it already is, as we can see in the writings 
2 Ash'arism is the main school of traditional Islamic orthodoxy (Sunnism). Unlike 
Mu'tazilism, it is a living tradition that has continued to flourish until the present. 
Ash'arism tends to emphasize Revelation over Reason, and offers a (divine-) positivist 
view of law, obligation, and morality as will be explained later. 
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of many philosophers (Pettigrove 2008, 457-464; Geuras 1992, 65-77; Londey 
1986, 4-10; Minas 1975, 138-150).3 However, they also serve to remind us of an 
old, and still unresolved, question about the God of Jacob and Abraham and 
the God of the Philosophers. The God ofJacob and Abraham, just like the God 
of Muhammad (or Islam) is a person, not a philosophical abstract principle. 
Thus, it comes as no surprise that Jewish, Christian, and Muslim theologians 
have struggled for centuries to formulate conceptions of God that are true to 
their canonical religious writings while at the same time addressing centu-
ries-old philosophical scruples. 
In order to discuss forgiveness in Islam (or Judaism and Christianity, for that 
matter) in the space of a short chapter, we cannot afford to dwell on the prob-
lem of anthropomorphism vs. "the true description of God." It is best and 
fairer to the religious point of view to take religious beliefs at their face value 
and not bother (at least not greatly) about what (some) philosophers have 
said about the proper conception of God. 
If we do this, that is, if we listen to what Muslim scripture (the Qur'an) says 
about God in matters considered relevant to forgiveness, we find that God does 
have some kind of affective life. For example, it is stated that on Judgment Day, 
God will be "well-pleased" with the faithful and that the faithful will also be 
well-pleased with God4 (5:119). God is "compassionate and merciful," as Mus-
lims regularly recite in the Opening (al-Fatihah) Chapter of the Qur'an, often 
viewed as the Lord's prayer of Muslims. In one verse God describes Himself as 
turning towards the Prophet and his companions and says that He is gentle to 
them, and all-compassionate (9:117). And while Muslim scripture does not as-
cribe resentment to God, there are many verses which speak of divine anger 
(2:61; 16:106; 20:81; 48:6). All of these considerations suggest some kind of di-
vine affective life even though it may not resemble human affective life when it 
comes to base emotions such as envy or jealousy. 5 
3 Pettigrove (2008, 457), in particular, enumerates 4 challenges that the Judea-Christian 
conception of divine forgiveness faces. All of these challenges are faced by the Islamic 
conception as well. 
4 One translation of the Qur'an speaks of "Allah taking pleasure in them and they in 
Him" (Pickthall, 1930, 135). 
s ln the Old Testament it is said: "ITihe Lord, whose name is Jealous, is a jealous God" 
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Ascribing to God a kind of affective life goes some way towards making the 
idea of divine forgiveness intelligible, especially in the context of divine mercy 
(which may turn out to be closely related to divine forgiveness), but it does 
not provide us with an answer to the question of how God acquires a standing 
to forgiue. In the case of human forgiveness, being wronged is a necessary 
condition for acquiring a standing to forgive, but how can this apply to God? 
To make matters more complicated, it seems that even when wrongdoing 
affects an entity other than God (e.g., a human being), God still remains in a 
position to forgive. However, if we follow Glen Pettigrove (and common 
sense, it could be claimed) in thinking that only victims of wrongdoing can 
acquire a standing to forgive, then we face a dilemma: "Either God cannot 
forgive the wrongs that usually concern us, viz. those done to human vic-
tims, or wrongdoing must always and only be seen as an offence against 
God" (Pettigrove 2008, 457-8). 
Of course, there is no choice but to take the second horn of the dilemma. In 
fact, not only has God been assumed to have a standing to forgive in all cases, 
it has sometimes been claimed that, strictly speaking, only God can forgive. 
The Qur'an explicitly poses a rhetorical question saying "Who but God can 
forgive sins?" (3:135) while the Psalmist declares, addressing God, "Against 
you, you alone, have I sinned." (Psalm 51:4). So, the question remains for 
Islam (and other Abraharnic religions) to answer: how do humans succeed in 
wronging God, when, for example, they tell lies or commit murder? 
There is a verse in the Qur'an, semi-mystical and hard to clarify, which some 
authors make much of in the present connection (Nasr 2007, 45; Khalil2012, 
27). The verse hints at some kind of primordial covenant between God and 
human beings, when all humans, before they were born, freely confessed 
(testified) that God is their (only) God and Creator, thereby (it could be in-
ferred) binding themselves to live in accordance with His will. 
And when thy Lord took from the Children of Adam, from their loins, 
their seed, and made them testify touching themselves, 'Am I not your 
Lord?' They said, 'Yes, we testify'-- lest you should say on the Day of 
Resurrection, 'As for us, we were heedless of this,' or lest you say, 'Our 
fathers were idolaters aforetime, and we were seed after them. (7:170) 
Follovvi.ng a line of thought suggested by this verse, it may be thought that 
God acquires rights in the context of this agreement and that subsequent 
moral violations (including ones that make forgiveness possible) could be 
viewed as violations of God's right to obedience. 
Other (Islamic) explanations which have been entertained refer to the grati-
tude which we owe God, who created us in his image, endowed us with reason, 
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and placed nature at our service. Such gifts may be thought to give God rights. 
On this view, the obligation to obey God is a debt of gratitude we owe Him.6 
Still, a third explanation can be found in the Asha'rite theory of the seman-
tics of "right" and "obligation." According to this theory, obligations and 
rights can be understood only in terms of laws laid down by a recognized 
authority. To do wrong is to transgress set boundaries. As God is the supreme 
authority in the entire universe (human and material), He has drawn bounda-
ries and set limits to what His human subjects can do.7 According to the fa-
mous theologian Ghazali (d. 1111), 
To do injustice is simply to undertake actions in a dominion which is 
ruled over by another, without flrst obtaining permission from the 
master. This, of course, is impossible in the case of God, for there is no 
dominion which does not belong to Him. (Ghazali 1975, 3) 
According to this line of thought, everything in the world, including human 
beings, belongs to God. He is the "owner" of His creation. If we undertake to 
do what He does not permit, we act unjustly, and thereby wrong Him. This 
does not mean that we injure Him or otherwise cause Him harm, but we do 
violate that which is His and His alone- and this is a kind ofwrong.8 
There is then a way for God to acquire a standing to forgive. Firstly, He is 
"wronged" by humans who act in His dominion in ways which the He does 
not perrnit. Furthermore, it does not please God to see humans acting unjust-
ly towards Him and/or His creation. On the contrary, it moves God to anger, 
and it merits chastisement. Thus, it seems that all, or most, of what is needed 
in order to talk about divine forgiveness is present in the Islamic faith. We can, 
therefore, proceed to discuss the questions which it is the object of this chap-
ter to discuss: how, to what extent, and under what circumstances does God 
forgive? What is the nature of His forgiveness? 
6 This seems to have been the view of certain Mu'tazilite thinkers of the Baghdad 
branch of the school, such as Abu al-Qasim al-Balkhi. See Vasalou (2008, 186). 
7 For a discussion of this and other related matters such as the "legal positivism" of 
much classical Islamic thought about law and morality, see Bahlul (2016, 245-66). 
s For similar and/or related ideas, see Pettigrove: "If God stands in something like a 
parental relationship to A, then the scope of A's wrongdoing may include letting God 
down as well as harming [another human being]." (Pettigrove 2008, 460). See also 
Geuras: "for the orthodox, traditional Christian, most moral offences, if not all of them, 
are offences against God. It is, if nothing else, an act of human disobedience against 
him." (Geurasl992,75) 
__"__, . --- -· . ·: . . ---- - ;.;o.-· 
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A God of Justice: Mu'tazilism and Divine Forgiveness 
Modern Arabic usage offers maghfira as the equivalent of "forgiveness."9 The 
abstract noun, along with the verb from which it is derived (ghafara), occurs 
more than 200 times in the Qur'an (McCullough 2000, 21). The term is never 
explicitly defined, but, of course, one does not expect explicit definitions in a 
book of holy scripture. At best, one can hope that contexts of use will clarify 
meaning insofar as this is possible. 
Initially, it may be noted that (divine) forgiveness does not appear to be grant-
ed unconditionally. Many of the following verses (taken from different part of 
the Qur'an) seem to suggest this. In one verse God praises those "who, when 
they commit an indecency ... pray forgiveness for their sins ... and do not perse-
vere in the things they did." (3:129) (Emphasis added). In another, we read that: 
"God is not likely to forgive those who believe, and then disbelieve, and then 
believe, and then disbelieve" (4:135). In still another, repentance and reparation 
are stipulated for forgiveness: "Whosoever of you does evil in ignorance, and 
thereafter repents and makes amends, God is all-forgiving, all-compassionate" 
(6:54). Other verses seem to make forgiveness conditional on fear of God, having 
goodness in one's heart, or performance of religious duties: 
0 believers, if you fear God, He will assign you a salvation, and acquit 
you of your evil deeds, and forgive you (8:29); 'If God knows of any 
good in your hearts He will give you better than what has been taken 
from you, and He will forgive you ( 8:70); But if they repent, and per-
form the prayer, and pay the alms, then let them go their way; God is 
All-forgiving. (9:5) 
Aside from conditionality, forgiveness seems to go along with the annulment of 
punishment. There is no Qur'anic statement which explicitly states that divine 
forgiveness entails this, but this is suggested by many verses where the Qur'an 
speaks of forgiveness and protection from hellfire in one and the same breath: 
And God sees His servants who say, "Our Lord, we believe; forgive us 
our sins, and guard us against the chastisement of the Fire" (3:14); [The 
Prophet pleads) Therefore forgive those who have repented, and follow 
Thy way, and guard them against the chastisement of Hell (40:7); 0, 
our people, answer God's summoner, and believe in Him, and He will 
9 The reason for being concerned with Arabic usage is the fact that Arabic is the lan-
guage for most, or all of the primary religious texts of Islam. Concepts framed in Arabic 
have played (and continue to play) the primary role in discussions relevant to Islam. 
Justice and Mercy 
forgive you some of your sins, and protect you from a painful chas-
tisement. (46:30) 
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There are also other verses that hold out a contrast, offering a reminder of 
polar opposites which lie in God's power: on the one hand there is suffering 
in Hell; on the other, there is forgiveness. This suggests an incompatibility 
whereby one side entails the negation of the other. 
Those are they that have bought error at the price of guidance, and 
chastisement at the price of pardon; how patiently they shall endure 
the Fire! (2:175); Surely thy Lord is a Lord of forgiveness and of painful 
retribution (41:40); Thy Lord is forgiving to men, for all their evil-doing, 
and thy Lord is terrible in retribution (13:6); God would never chastise 
them as long as they begged for forgiveness. (8:30) 
The fact that forgiveness is conditional and that subsequent withholding of 
punishment is not free suggests that God holds people accountable for their 
deeds. He chastises for evil actions as justice requires, and he forgives when 
sinners repent and make amends, again as justice requires. The impression is 
corroborated by many other verses in the Qur'an, which are not concerned 
with forgiveness as such but which nonetheless can have implications for 
forgiveness. The Qur'an describes the Day of Judgment as a day of reckoning. 
Human beings show up before God with a complete record of their deeds: 
"And the Book shall be set in place; and thou wilt see the sinners fearful at 
what is in it, and saying, 'Alas for us! How is it with this Book, that it leaves 
nothing behind, small or great, but it has numbered it?' And they shall find all 
they wrought present, and thy Lord shall not wrong anyone" (18:45). All deeds 
will be justly judged: "Whoso has done an iota of good shall see it, and whoso 
has done an iota of evil shall see it" (99:5). Good and evil deeds are placed on 
a scale: "The weighing on that Day is true. Those whose scale is heavy, they 
shall prosper. Those whose scale is light are the ones who have lost their souls 
because they disbelieved Our signs" (7:8-9). 
Statements of this type abound in the Qur'an, leading to the wide-spread 
perception within Islam and without that God is an absolute ruler "whose 
justice swallows up his holiness" (Knietschke 1912, 64) and that He is a God of 
strict justice, One "[whose] mercy and forgiveness are strictly for the virtuous 
ones" (Rahbar 1960, 213). 
It remains to be seen whether this is the only possible way to view the 
Qur'anic message. Nevertheless, it is a possible point of view, and it seems to 
have been espoused wholeheartedly by the Mu'tazilites, to whose views on 
forgiveness we now turn. 
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Among all Islamic schools of theology, Mu'tazilism seems to have been the 
one to take the notion of divine justice most seriously. However, their appar-
ently uncompromising insistence on divine justice in the context of desert 
(deserved punishments and rewards) led them to construct a general theoret-
ical scheme which left the concept of forgiveness with little or no substantive 
role to play. There are also doubts as to the ultimate coherence of their con-
cept of forgiveness. 
To begin with what is obvious, the Mu'tazilites offer (or accept) a fairly clear 
definition of forgiveness: the annulment or remission or deserved punishment. 
('Abd al-Jabbar 1996, 677). Furthermore, they claim that there are three and 
only three ways of annulling deserved punishment. The first is for the sirmer 
to repent and (we may assume) make amends when this is feasible. The sec-
ond is to perform greater good deeds so as to expiate for (yukaffi.r) the de-
served punishment (and thus annul it). These two methods of annulment are 
summarized thus: 
As for punishment deserved from God, it can be annulled through 
one's regretting the acts of disobedience one has committed, or by an 
act of obedience that is greater than it [i.e., the punishment deserved]. 
The ground here is the same as in reward. to (Vasalou 2008, 189-190) 
The third method is for God to grant pardon (' afwu) for the sinner out of 
sheer beneficence (tafaddun, independent of deserved merit: 
[T)here is a further ground that is such as to effect the annulment of pun-
ishrnent deserved from God, and that is God's decision to annul it and 
forgive one's sins- - a ground that does not apply in the case of reward, as 
we have already explained. (Vasalou 2008, 190; 'Abd al-Jab bar 1996, 644) 
The Mu'tazilites elaborate further on these and other related ideas. To begin 
with, they distinguish between grave sins (kaba'il? and mirlor sins [sagha'in. 
Grave sins include murder, adultery, witchcraft, and the slandering of believing 
women. The deserved punishment for a grave sin is eternal-in accordance with 
the Qur'an-- "[W]hoso slays a believer willfully, his recompense is Hellfire, 
therein dwelling forever" (4:93). Minor sins include sins for which Scripture has 
not prescribed a punishment-such as taking a second glance at "foreign wom-
en," failing to keep an appointment. not returning a greeting, being impatient, 
lOAs to the annulment of reward: " ... reward is annulled in either of two ways: through 
one's regretting [nadam) the acts of obedience one has performed, or one's commis-
sion of a sin that is greater than [the reward deserved] (Vasalou 2008, 190). 
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and the like. No number of good deeds is sufficient to expiate for an unrepented 
grave sin, which has the effect of "frustrating" (yuhbit =cancel, annul) all one's 
good deeds. Minor sins, however, are automatically expiated by being outnum-
bered by good deeds. According to 'Abd al-Jabbar, "In the case of minor sins 
[sagha'ir), acts of obedience will bring about the annulment of deserved pun-
ishment. For grave sins [kaba'ir) however, this will not the case-- deserved pun-
ishment will not be annulled on account of however many acts of obedience in 
lives as short as ours" ('Abd al-Jabbar 1996, 644). 
Further elaboration on the relation between good and evil deeds (grave or not) 
is provided by the concept of aggregation. Good deeds expiate (yukajfif) for evil 
deeds, and the latter 'frustrate' (yuhbit, annul) the former. Here the Mu'tazilites 
rely on Qura'nic verses such as: "Good deeds annul (yuthhibu) evil ones" (liter-
ally "make them go away") (11:112). Thus, we find 'Abd al-Jabbar saying: 
Either one lives a life of complete obedience to God, or one of com-
plete disobedience, or a mixed kind of life. If it is a mixed kind of life, 
then it is impossible that acts of obedience will be equal to those of 
disobedience. Either the good will be greater than the evil, or the evil 
than the good. In such cases, the lesser of the two will be annulled by 
the greater part, and this is what we mean by expiation and frustration. 
('Abd al-Jabbar 1996, 625) 
Thus, if one does an evil deed for which one deserves 20 "parts" (units) of 
punishment and a good deed for which one deserves only 10 "parts" of re-
ward, then one will be punished to the extent of 10 units only. The remaining 
10 will have been annulled by the deserved reward. This is all, Abd al-Jabbar 
claims, in accordance with the Qur'anic verse which says, "Whoso has done 
an iota of good shall see it, and whoso has done an iota of evil shall see it 
(99:5)" (Abd al-Jabbar 1996, 629). 
Aggregation, of course, presupposes that good and evil deeds are countable 
and commensurable. Modern philosophers do not pass over such assump-
tions lightly, but we can afford to ignore them in the present context. Of more 
interest to us is the outcome of the comparison: it is impossible for good and 
evil deeds to turn out to be equal in weight! The reason for this (harking back 
to the idea of strict justice), is that equality would make it impossible for God 
to consign the person either to Hell or Heaven (these being the only two 
abodes in the afterlife). God cannot consign the sinner to Hell because this 
would be unjust, but He cannot consign him to Heaven either, on account of 
not having a surplus of good deeds (credit) through which he will deserve to 
go to Heaven. In the words of 'Abd al-Jabbar: 
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If acts of obedience were to be equal to sin, then the subject of Law 
(mukallaf) would go either to Hell (which would be unjust) or he would 
go to Heaven. If he were to go to Heaven, this would have to be either as 
a reward, or as act of beneficence (tafadduQ. It could not be the former, 
for it is wrong to reward one who does not deserve to be rewarded ... 
[And} it could not be an act of beneficence, because (as the community 
of Muslims have agreed), only children, [and} the insane ... are the object 
of such beneficence. Therefore, it is impossible that acts of obedience 
and sinful acts should be equal. ('Abd al-Jabbar 1996, 623-4) 
It is remarkable that the concept of beneficence (tafadduQ is denied a possible 
and useful role here. Tafadul (literally, acting generously towards) often plays a 
role akin to that of mercy and pardon and thus approximates our concept of 
forgiveness. Apart from repentance and greater good works, tafaddul is the third 
way in which deserved punishment can be annulled, and it is totally in God's 
hands. It is also the only divine act which is recognizably unconditional. Re-
pentance and greater good deeds must be rewarded by God, but tafaddul is not 
obligatory. It is more like a free gift, should God be willing to dispense it. 
The Mu'tazilite denial that adult, sane humans can enter Heaven in an act of 
tafaddul is tantamount to saying that a person cannot enter Heaven by being 
forgiven. The implication, all but explicit, is that entry into Heaven has to be 
earned by actions for which the person is solely responsible (repentance and 
greater good deeds). 
The weakness of the Mu'tazilite position here is further highlighted by ref-
erence to a disagreement between two factions within the school. Theologi-
ans of the Basra branch ofMu'tazilism, to which 'Abd al-Jabbar belonged, said 
that it would be good for God to pardon those who deserve to be punished. 
It is our creed that it is good for God to pardon and not punish unbe-
lievers and grave sinners, but He did tell us in the Qur'an that He will 
do to them what they deserve. ('Abd al-Jabbar, 1996, 644) 
Theologians of the Baghdad branch, however, appear to have espoused the 
opposite view, saying that "God is obliged to punish evil doers; it is not right 
for Him to pardon them" ('Abd al-Jabbar 1996, 644-45). 
It can be argued that the Mu'tazilites of Baghdad were on stronger grounds 
here. For when their Basran colleagues came to provide justification for the 
view that the punishment of grave sinners and unbelievers would last forever, 
they found themselves arguing for the eternity of punishment on the basis of 
the impossibility of pardon. Their argument went like this: 
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Either the sinner will be forgiven or he will not be. If the latter, then he 
will reside in Hell forever (which is what we claim). If the former, then 
he cannot but enter Heaven (there being no intermediate abode be-
tween Heaven and Hell). If He enters Heaven, he will either enter it as 
someone who is rewarded, or as an act of beneficence. He cannot enter 
Heaven as an act of beneficence, for as the community of Muslims 
have agreed, those who enter Heaven must have attributes which dis-
tinguish them from ... children and the insane [who are not subject to 
the Law]. Nor can such a sinner enter Heaven as a reward, for he does 
not deserve to be rewarded. [Therefore it will not be possible for the 
sinner to leave Hell ever.] ('Abd al-Jabbar 1996, 666) 
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According to this argument, grave sinners cannot enter Heaven, because they 
have no positive desert. Yet to say that it would good for God to pardon them 
implies (via steps used in the above argument) that it would be good for God 
to allow them into Heaven (for this is what pardoning them •'llilllead to, given 
that the only abode outside of Hell is Heaven). So how can it possibly be good 
for God to pardon them, given that it is impossible for them to enter Heaven? 
This is tantamount to an admission of the incoherence of the concept of for-
giveness. On the one hand, one maintains that something cannot be done, on 
the other hand, that it would be good to do it. 
Matters can be worse if we assume that repentant grave sinners, and even 
some non-grave sinners, may not succeed in accumulating a surplus of good 
works that will outweigh their cumulative burden of minor sins. Such people 
cannot enter Heaven because to do so requires having accumulated greater 
good than evil. Once in Hell for their due punishment, how are they ever go-
ing to exit and join others in Heaven? 
Suppose they are punished for their surplus of evil till this is wiped out. 
Their stock of good deeds has already been "frustrated" (yuhbit) by their mi-
nor sins (which is what landed them in Hell in the first place). They cannot go 
to Heaven because nobody enters Heaven except by good works, and these (in 
the present) case have been "frustrated" by their cumulative minor sins. But if 
they were to stay in Hell indefmitely, will not this place them on the same 
footing with the unrepentant grave sinner and outright unbelievers?H If God's 
11 According their adversaries, the Mu'tazilites are committed to the view that whoever 
enters Hell remains there. 'Abd al-Jabbar himself says something to this effect- "it is 
the consensus of the community that whoever departs from this world deserving pun-
ishment will never witness peace or ease afterwards" ('Abd al-Jabbar 1996, 626). 
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mercy, beneficence, or (simply) his forgiveness does not tip the scales here, 
what is left for it to do? Very little, it seems. 
At a later point in his discussion, 'Abd al-Jabbar raises the question of interces-
sion for grave sinners by referencing a generally accepted tradition which has 
the Prophet saying the following: "My intercession shall be reserved for the 
grave-sinning members of my community" (Abu Dawud 1997, Bk. 40, #4739). 
'Abd al-Jabbar quickly reinterprets this tradition by appending an if-clause to 
it- "if they repent"-making success conditional on repentance ('Abd al-Jabbar 
1996, 691). However, this can hardly be needed for the annulment of the grave 
sin, given that the Mu'tazilite have always said that God is obliged to annul pun-
ishment once repentance has taken place. 'Abd al-Jabbar finds a modest role for 
intercession in that God may, by way of tafaddul (beneficence), elevate the sta-
tus of one who is already in Heaven (691). This may be of value to a repentant 
grave sinner who manages to enter Heaven ·with a modest surplus of good 
deeds, having blown out most of his credit with his grave sin. 
In vain one looks for a sign of substantive forgiveness in Mu'tazilite thought. It 
seems that their thinking was dominated by conditionality and obligation and a 
strict calculus of rewards and punishments. With them, God ends up being 
nothing more than a master book-keeper who maintains records, scales and 
. balances, never swerving from what justice dictates. Forgiveness is not so much 
something that God does. It reduces to God allowing the calculus of good and 
evil deeds to produce a positive result. A process of expiation and frustration 
operates almost mechanically, with God merely keeping record of outcomes. 
Entry into Heaven must be earned. Having failed to earn the needed credit, the 
human is not picked up by the grace of God who, exercising mercy and/ or offer-
ing a free gift of forgiveness, takes humans back into the divine fold. 
The God of Mercy: An Alternative Perspective 
According to Mohammad Khalil, the Islamic project of salvation (najat, deliv-
erance, redemption) has two pillars: self-rectification and divine forgiveness 
(Khalil 2012, 11). In light of our discussion in the last section, it could be said 
that the Mu'tazilites seem to have recognized only the first. Self-rectification, 
which involves doing good works and earning credit on your own, fits well 
with the picture of a perfectly just God. In this framework of a just calculus of 
deserts, divine forgiveness seems out of place. 
The Ash'arites, who in opposition to Mu'tazilism traditionally represented the 
party of orthodoxy, were no less aware of the notion of divine justice, but they 
tended to place more emphasis on the utter independence of God, his infinite 
power and transcendence, and the fact that all humans, in the final analysis, 
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were at his mercy. Thus, for them, the right thing to do was to have piety and put 
one's faith in God rather than engage in a rational calculus of deserts. 
The Qur'an itself is very emphatic about the need to have faith in divine 
mercy. In fact, despair of God's mercy is often equated with unbelief: 
And who despairs of the mercy of his Lord, excepting those that are 
astray?' (15:55); Do not despair of God's mercy; of God's mercy no man 
despairs, excepting [ ... ] the unbelievers (12:85); Say: '0 my people who 
have been prodigal against yourselves, do not despair of God's mercy; 
surely God forgives sins altogether; surely He is the All-forgiving, the 
All-compassionate.' (39:54) 
An exploration of what successive generations of (mainly) Ash'arite thinkers 
said about the notion of mercy reveals different, seemingly unrelated concep-
tualizations. These may be conceived of as concentric circles of ever-widening 
inclusiveness, up to a point where all humanity is encompassed in God's 
mercy. The first circle can be identified with the widely held belief that on 
Judgment Day, the Prophet would intercede on behalf of the grave sinners of 
his (Muslim) community. A wider circle of inclusiveness brings in people who, 
for a variety of reasons were not properly exposed to the message of Islam. Fi-
nally, there is a doctrine entertained by many well-known later thinkers in the 
Ash'arite tradition, according to which, one day, Hell would be annihilated 
after being emptied of all its inhabitants. 
It will by degrees become clear how intercession, the pardoning of unin-
formed non-believers, and the final annihilation of Hell, can all be viewed as 
manifestations of divine mercy. The first two can be dealt with rather briefly. It 
is the last which affords a deeper look at the logic of divine mercy. 
As we saw in the last section, (unrepented) grave sin, for the Mu'tazilites, 
merits eternal ptm.ishment. However, while there are indeed verses which 
seem to suggest this (4:93; 4:169; 33:65), there is a well-known verse according 
to which God grants forgiveness to whomever He wills except for unbelievers 
{4:48). Grave sinners are not indicated for eternal ptm.ishment in this fairly 
clear and categorical verse. Apparent inconsistencies of this kind led to end-
less debates among theologians belonging to different schools, including 
Ash'arism and Mu'tazilism. To all appearances, however, the Ash'arites seem 
to have achieved a lasting victory, when they succeeded in elevating to canon-
ical status a well-known saying of the Prophet "My intercession is reserved 
for the grave sinners of my comrntm.ity" (Abu Dawud 2009, Bk. 40 #4739). 
Of course, successful intercession is a measure of the Prophet's standing be-
fore God, but there are numerous places in the Qur'an where it is made clear 
that nobody is able to intercede without God's permission. {2:255; 21:28); more-
- --- ' . . . - .. ;.-- - .· 
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over, it has never been claimed that the Prophet had inherent powers to forgive 
or make any difference to his or other people's fate. We must thus believe that 
what the Prophet delivers is no more than what God Himself has willed in the 
first place and that the role of Prophet is simply to be an instrument of God's 
will. In other words, intercession must be viewed as an act of divine mercy. 
How do grave sinners become eligible for mercy? Not on the strength of 
their good works, for had these sufficed, there would have been no need for 
divine mercy. Nor would they go to Heaven on account of having received 
their deserved punishment to the full extent. For punishment does not 
change evil deeds into good ones; at most it redresses (or restores) a balance 
so that one neither deserves further punishment nor yet deserves a reward. 
Obviously, something else is needed to tip the balance. This cannot be other 
than divine mercy, beneficence, or grace- free and undeserved. 
A similar logic comes into play for uninformed (or misinformed) non-
believers. A crucial Qur'anic verse which is often used to lay the ground for 
divine mercy in such cases is "We do not punish until we have sent a Messen-
ger" (17: 15). It is permissible, of course, to view this as an implication of di-
vine justice: God rewards for acts of obedience and punishes for acts of diso-
bedience, as revealed in the Qur'an (and previous revelations). If no revelation 
is available for one to learn from, then it seems unfair to punish, for one can 
disobey only when there are laws to be obeyed. 
All the same, some theologians, no doubt imbued with a sense of divine jus-
tice, could not think that uninformed non-believers were in a position to 
harvest any rewards either-for there could be no rewards without acts of 
obedience (known through revelation). Thus, a situation of "no punishment, 
no reward," an impasse of sorts, ensues. What kind of ultimate destiny could 
await individuals? 
According to al-Baghdadi, an Ash'arite theologian (d. 1037), such people 
should not have any expectations one way or the other. Their fate is in the 
hands of God "who does as He wills" (11:107): 
If God were to cause them to suffer in the afterlife, that would be just 
(without this being a case of just punishment); if God were to be gra-
cious to them [thus allowing them to enter Paradise] that would be an 
act of beneficence on the part of God, not an act of rewarding. (al-
Baghdadi 1928, 263) 
AI-Baghdadi is unwilling to judge on behalf of God. However, Ghazali, who 
lived one generation after al-Baghdadi, was more decisive: God's all-
encompassing mercy includes such people. 
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I would say that ... most of the Christians of Byzantiwn and the Turks 
of this age will be covered by God's mercy. I am referring here to those 
who reside in the far regions of Byzantiwn and Anatolia who have not 
come in contact with the message of Islam. (Jackson 2002, 126) 
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Yet despite his deep convictions about divine mercy, Ghazali could not bring 
himself to believe that God could forgive those who, despite adequate expo-
sure, fail to believe - a "group that will dwell in Hellfire forever" (Jackson 
2002, 127). Ghazali, like many theologians before him and after, thought that 
unbelief was unforgivable. What he did, without this being a small achieve-
ment, was to qualify this for the benefit of those whose unbelief can be ex-
cused by reference to inadequate knowledge of Islam. 
It remained for subsequent thinkers to define a final scope of divine mercy from 
which no one would be excluded. On the surface, these theologians debated over 
Qur'anic verses thought by some to imply that chastisement is eternal (or not) 
(e.g., 4:169; 9:93; 23:103; 40:93) - matters seemingly unrelated to mercy. Some said 
that Hell does not last forever, thus implYing that punishment of sinners would not 
last forever either. However, as there is only one ultimate abode other than Hell, 
namely Paradise, the conclusion must be that, one day, all people will be in Para-
dise, God having forgiven, pardoned, or extended his mercy to them. 
Supporters and opponents of the notion of eternal punishment offered rival 
interpretations of relevant Qur'anic texts and Prophetic traditions, but it is not 
here that the most interesting and compelling arguments are to be found. At a 
level higher than that of grammatical and semantic analysis of texts, the dis-
cussion becomes philosophical, touching on ultimate questions about the 
nature and attributes of God - His wisdom, justice, mercy, anger - as well as 
the philosophy of punishment. 
One of the most interesting arguments that was employed in favour of a 
non-eternal Hell is based on a distinction between the unchanging eternal 
nature on the one hand, and actions and creations that are not part of God's 
nature, on the other. Divine nature is wise, just, merciful, knowing, benefi-
cent, and forgiving. Actions and creations that are not part of His nature in-
clude chastisement and Fire. In the words oflbn Qayyim (d. 1350): 
Paradise and reward are implied by God's mercy, forgiveness, and be-
neficence, and for this reason He attributes these to Himself. As to suf-
fering and punishment, these are created by God, and for this reason 
He does not call Himself "chastiser" or "cause of suffering". On the 
contrary, it is made clear that mercy is one of his attributes, whereas 
chastisement is one of his actions; this is made clear in one the same 
verse: "Know that God punishes severely, but that He is also forgiving 
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and merciful." (5:98) ... What is implied by his Names and attributes 
lasts as long as these last ... It is not among God's attributes to be eter-
nally punishing, or angry." 12 (Ibn Qayyim 1997, 262) 
Here it must be noted that Ibn Qayyim, in line with Islam's (and Abrahamic 
religion's) conception of itself, does not balk at saying that God changes from 
being angry to being pleased or satisfied, once sinners have been purified by 
their temporary chastisement. According to the same author: 
As to His anger and displeasure ... these are not intrinsic attributes 
which it is impossible for God to do without, as if we were to say that 
God is has always and will be always angry ... the suffering of chastise-
ment arises from the quality of his anger-fue burns by virtue of God's 
anger .... Should God's anger come to an end, being replaced by his 
good pleasure, his chastisement comes to an end and is replaced by his 
mercy. (Ibn Qayyim 1997, 259) 
God's mercy, however, does not operate in isolation from his wisdom and his 
justice. In the matter of eternal punishment at least, justice opens the door for 
mercy to operate in that justice requires that chastisement should have a 
finite, rather than an infinite, duration. It is as if justice requires that God's 
response to sin be proportional: 
It is an implication of God's justice that He does not increase chas-
tisement beyond what is deserved .... But the duration of unbelief and 
polytheism is finite; therefore, how can chastisement be eternal, last-
ing forever without interruption? (Ibn Qayyim, 2004, 656) 
Again, as before, when chastisement has come to an end, the question arises 
as to the sinner's fmal abode. Given that there is only Heaven outside of Hell, 
it follows that the sinner will join the believers in Heaven after a finite pun-
ishment. However, this will not be on account of any deserved reward, for 
deserved rewards have already been lost in the aggregation of good and evil 
deeds (which is what led to meriting punishment in the first place). Nothing 
other than God's mercy will accomplish the transition to Heaven. 
12 Ibn Qayyim's meaning may be clarified by saying that punishing is what God does 
(hence the verbal form of expression- 'punishes severely'), whereas 'merciful' is what 
God is (hence the adjectival form.) Adjectives (in Arabic) denote attributes, but they can 
be used as common nouns also. The 'most beautiful names of God' are derived from 
adjectives by the simple addition of "the". Thus, God is "The Merciful [one]," "The 
Compassionate," "The Forgiving," "The First," "The Last," etc. 
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Whereas God's justice opens the door for His mercy to operate, God's wis-
dom serves to make His mercy intelligible in the light of reason. God did not 
institute chastisement in vain, with no purpose to serve. Once the purpose 
has been served, there is no call for punislunent to continue. By default, God 
is merciful, compassionate, and beneficent, and this is what he resorts to 
being after the objective of chastisement has been accomplished: 
Fire was created in order to make the faithful fearful of sin, and in or-
der to purify the sinners and criminals (through suffering in Hell). 
Should sinners succeed in achieving purity in this world by means of 
repentance and good works which expiate for sin, no after-life purifica-
tion will be required of them. . . . God has no reason to chastise His 
servants without cause, for He has said: "What use would God have for 
your suffering, if you are thankful and believing?" ... (4:147) God the 
Exalted does not take pleasure in the suffering of his creatures ... chas-
tisement is just mercy and purification for the sinner, even though it is 
painful to him. (Ibn Qayyim 1997, 257-8) 
Once chastised to the extent necessary for purifying the soul, the sinner is 
restored to the primordial state of pure nature when the soul readily attested 
to the unity and justice of God (in accordance with 7:170). Once again, the 
matter lies before God: what is to be done with restored original nature, which 
is now God's unsoiled creation? God is merciful by nature. What other destiny 
can await such a soul except Paradise? 
Having reached this point, one might think that we have re-entered the 
realm of "obligatory for God to do" which the Mu'tazilites dryly invoked at 
many points in their enduring argument with the Ash'arites. If this is the case, 
there is a new twist here: what is 'obligatory' is mercy, not so much dry and 
soul-less justice, based on arithmetic calculation. 
The Ash'arites, however, were not fond of attributing obligations to God, but 
they do not need to employ this term in order to express a meaning whose 
purpose is to assure believers that God is unchangeable on the score of mercy. 
In the Qur'an, God states, "Your Lord hath prescribed for Himself mercy" 
(6:54). This is not a light commitment for God to take upon Himself. Taken to 
the limit, it means that ultimately, all humanity will be reconciled with God. 
Concluding Remarks 
It must not be thought that the Ash'arites were indifferent to the notion of 
divine justice, or that they were less cognizant of it than the Mu'tazilites. 
They certainly would have had little understanding or sympathy for "reli-
gious ideologies as have put their whole emphasis on God's love ... of His 
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children" (Rahman 1980, 6). Nevertheless, the two schools tenceci to em-
phasize different aspects of divine being. The Mu'tazilite God is a God of 
justice; that of the Ash'arites is a just but merciful God. He punishes sinners 
but, in the end, takes mercy on them. On some interpretations tolerated by 
the Ash'arites, no one should take it for granted that he will go to Heaven or 
that he will not be touched by fire for a long or short period of time. How-
ever, amid fear of God and the uncertainty about ultimate fate, the Ash'arite 
believer remembers not to despair of God's mercy. 
Such a believer has what is essential to religion: Faith. Ibn Qayyim (re)tells a 
story of two sinners who succeeded in drawing God attention by their loud 
crying in Hell. "Why are you crying so loudly?" the Lord asks. "We do this so 
that You will have mercy on us," was the reply. To this God responds: "My 
mercy is for you to go back where you came from." According to the story, one 
of the two sinners does as told, only to fmd, upon arriving there, that Fire is no 
more a place of suffering-it is cool, and peaceful. The Lord asks the other 
sinner why he did not follow the example of his friend. "I have hope You will 
not send me back," says the sinner. Upon hearing this, God allows both to 
enter Heaven by His mercy (Ibn Qayyim 1997, 261). 
On the face of it, this is a story of Faith and Hope. The first fellow had Faith -
he did God's bidding without questioning God's ways. The second one lin-
gered behind, hoping that God would not insist on sending him back. 
In this story justice does not disappear, but it does not take center stage. 
Sinners are punished for their sin (perhaps a little too severely for our modern 
tastes), but in the end, God takes them back, even those who had not done 
any good in all their life. This is probably why we, human beings, sinners and 
regular wrongdoers, fmd forgiveness desirable. What we are primarily after is 
mercy and compassion, even though we may accept due punishment in ac-
cordance with justice. 
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